The Egyptian Strategy for the Yom Kippur War

An Analysis

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About the Book

This volume examines the military strategy and issues that Egyptian war planners faced during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Of major interest is the relationship between the political and military leaders and how that affected the buildup and course of the conflict. Taking this as a starting place, the author concentrates on how Soviet military doctrinal changes presented themselves between the conclusion of the Six-Day War and the Yom Kippur War.

About the Author(s)

Dani Asher served in the Israel Defense Forces intelligence service for more than 40 years, mainly dealing with the southern front with Egypt, and took part in all the IDF wars since 1962. He has written many classified books and articles about wars in the Middle East. He teaches in the IDF war colleges and is a member of the Israeli and the International Commission for Military History.

Bibliographic Details

Dani Asher

Format: softcover (7 x 10)
Pages: 286
Bibliographic Info: 11 photos, maps, appendices, notes, bibliography, index
Copyright Date: 2009
pISBN: 978-0-7864-4253-9
eISBN: 978-0-7864-5400-6
Imprint: McFarland

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments      vii
Foreword by Major General Shlomo Gazit (Ret.)      1
Preface      3
Introduction: The Egyptian Military Concept on the Eve of the Yom Kippur War      9

1. The Egyptian Army: From the Six-Day War to the End of the War of Attrition      13
2. Israel’s Defense System on the Sinai Front      35
3. Egypt Prior to the Yom Kippur War: Acceptance of the Soviet Warfare Doctrine      56
4. Potential Problems in the Campaign: Planning the Military Solutions      72
5. The Soviet Warfare Doctrine and Its Application by the Egyptians      97

Conclusion      178
Appendix A: The Soviet Warfare Doctrine—The Attack at the Divisional and Field Army Levels      187
Appendix B: The Development of Deception in the Soviet Warfare Doctrine      202
Appendix C: The Infantry Division Crossing a Water Obstacle, Order No. 41 from the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces      205
Appendix D: The Second Infantry Division’s Attack Order in the Yom Kippur War      226
Appendix E: Battle Order No. 1 for Operation “Granite 2 Improved,” Issued by the Commander of the Seventh Division      228
Appendix F: The IDF’s Defense System on the Suez Canal and Its Capture by the Attacking Forces      233
Chapter Notes      241
Bibliography      267
Index      272