Kissinger and the Yom Kippur War

The 1973 Yom Kippur War marked a turning point in the “special relationship” between the United States and Israel. While previous U.S. administrations had taken a relatively even hand in the Middle East, the action saw American support of Israel become virtually unconditional. A massive airlift of military hardware to Israel brought the U.S. and the Soviet Union closer to conflict.
As the war—just two weeks in duration—played out along the Suez Canal, U.S. Vice President Spiro Agnew was forced to resign amidst bribery allegations. Watergate escalated, resulting in President Nixon’s near-breakdown. Despite Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s efforts to supply arms to Israel, he was stymied by resistance in the Department of Defense, which some saw as overly provocative toward the Arabs. Ostensibly a U.S. foreign policy success, the war led directly to the 1974 oil crisis and a permanent rift in U.S.–Arab relations.
Drawing on Kissinger’s telephone conversations and recently declassified documents, this book tells the story of how the secretary became the chief architect of America’s Middle East policy, and how his Cold War strategy played a critical role in the decision to pursue active military involvement.

David R. Morse is the CEO of a market research company in Los Angeles that specializes in multicultural consumers. He lives in Laguna Beach, California.

David R. Morse
Format: softcover (6 x 9)
Pages: 216
Bibliographic Info: 9 photos, notes, bibliography, index
Copyright Date: 2015
pISBN: 978-0-7864-9864-2
eISBN: 978-1-4766-2077-0
Imprint: McFarland

Table of Contents


Preface 1

1. Nixon, Kissinger and the “Special Relationship” 5

2. The Prelude to War 23

3. The Inadequacies of Diplomacy and Bureaucracy 64

4. The Tide Turns 101

5. Negotiating a Ceasefire 120

6. The Failure to Avoid a Superpower Confrontation 137

7. Aftermath 165

Chapter Notes 173

Bibliography 193

Index 199