World War II Battles Reconsidered

Written by a former Harvard professor of decision science and game theory, this book presents original insights on the strategies and tactics undertaken in four major battles of the Second World War. That the fighting at Gazala in Libya in the late spring of 1942 constituted what has been called “probably the most spectacular series of victories ever gained over a British army” was in part due to its having violated the game-theoretic Zero-Sum Maxim of Napoleon: “Do not do what your enemy wishes you to.” The sensational British reversal of that disaster later that year at El Alamein in Egypt derived largely from heeding the millennia-old military priority of command unity, which has been analyzed and re-endorsed by modern decision science. This discipline has also judged the somewhat disappointing victory of the Allies at Falaise in France in August of 1944 to have resulted from excessive risk aversion—possibly induced by three different types of fatigue. One month later, the Allied setback at Arnhem in the Netherlands called into question, from the perspective of game theory, the value of battlefield surprise. These decisions, approached from an expert perspective on game theory and presented with high-quality maps, are presented in this pioneering application of decision science to the battles of World War II.

Mark Thompson was a full-time professor at Harvard University from 1975 to 1983 and has been a visiting professor at the Université de Paris and the Universität Bielefeld in North Rhine-Westphalia in Germany. He taught courses on decision science, game theory, and social program evaluation. He lives in Lexington, Massachusetts.

Mark Thompson
Format: softcover (7 x 10)
Pages: 278
Bibliographic Info: notes, bibliography, index
Copyright Date: 2025
pISBN: 978-1-4766-9673-7
eISBN: 978-1-4766-5472-0
Imprint: McFarland

Acknowledgments       vi
Prologue  1
1. A Framework for Assessing Military Decisions 7
Rating Outcomes       7
Factors Affecting Outcomes       10
­Meta-Decisions and Situational Factors       11
Informational Decisions       19
Strategic and Tactical Considerations       26
Chapter Recapitulation: A Framework for Understanding and Assessing ­Meta-Decisions, Situational Factors, Informational Decisions, Strategic and Tactical Considerations, and Their Consequences       40
2. Gazala 45
The Warring World       45
­Over-Promoted and ­Under-Competent: The ­Meta-Decision on Eighth Army Command at Gazala       51
“Lamentable” British Inaction “while the Russians were fighting desperately and valiantly”: ­Pre-Battle Decisions
53
Pushback to Prime Ministerial Pressure: Enabling the Axis to Move First       55
“Seriously worried” Rommel: The Outcome of the First Two Days       56
Baseless British Bravado, Stirring French Staunchness, and Annihilative German Efficiency: ­In-Battle Decisions Over ­Two-Plus Weeks       57
“Tobruk must be held … and I order you to do it”: ­Late-Battle Decision Reversal       60
“Defeat is one thing; disgrace is another”: Rating the Outcome       62
At Speed into Egypt Up to a Small Depot       63
“Killing a magnificent stag”: ­Meta-Decisions on British Commands       65
Force Strengths       67
“Ah, now we’ve got him”: Confidence and Morale       69
“Tell[ing] a chief … the things he most likes to hear”: Concentration, Reporting, Fatigue, and Luck       71
“Rommel, Rommel, Rommel! What else matters but beating him!” ­Principal-Agent Disconnect       73
Cowpats and Concentration: Rating the ­Meta-Decision on Eighth Army Command       75
­Meta-Decisional Query: Whose Was the “crowning blunder” That Lost 33,000 Commonwealth Soldiers at Tobruk to Captivity?       77
“Barking out orders” versus “an awful lot of paperwork”: ­Meta-Decisional Differences       79
“Much resented”: Organizational Behavior, Military Politics, and Commander Positioning       80
“Cloud cuckoo land”: Informational Delusion       82
“Continued magnificent work”: Informational Processes       83
Negative Information Value: Misinterpretation       85
Positive Information Value: The American Leak       87
“But the bear blew first”: ­Move-Order Decisions       88
Deciding: Likelihoods, Values, and Aversions to Risk and Loss       89
Conclusions • 90
3. El Alamein 92
Prodding for Mines in Moonlight with Bayonets       92
The ­Zero-Sum Maxim of Napoleon Turned Around: Battle Decisions at El Alamein       95
“With an insubordinate smile”: Montgomery Comes to the Eighth Army       99
“A queer little bloke”: Rating the ­Meta-Decisional Command Changes       100
“Our last chance of an offensive”: ­Pre-Battle Decisions at Alam Halfa       103
“The swine isn’t attacking”: ­Mid-Battle Decision at Alam Halfa       105
“Our last chance of gaining the Suez Canal had gone”: Results and Explanations       107
Announcing the Imminent Axis Capture of Alexandria: The ­Lead-Up to October 23       108
The Battle       108
So Close to Full: “Ring the bells all over Britain for the first time this war”       110
But Not Quite: The ­Cut-Short Cop       111
Force Strengths: Pitchfork Against ­Tommy-Gun       112
Probable Failure versus Assured Complete Victory: Framing the Decision on Attack Timing       113
“Gnaw[ing] their way yard by yard”: Battle Decisions of Montgomery       115
“Military interests” versus “propaganda”: Pre–and ­Mid-Battle Decisions of the Axis       117
­Post-Battle Decisions of Montgomery       119
“Cautious—to my mind, excessively so”: Rommel on Montgomery       122
Was Montgomery Just “lucky … to have such immense resources?”: Eighth Army Upgrades       123
“Complete chaos existed”: Informational Advantage       123
“Had we not got a single general who could even win one single battle?” Having Appropriate Resolution       125
“As lost as a dray horse on a polo field”: The Escape of Rommel’s Army       127
“So proud of his success to date”: The Behavior Respecting Risk of Montgomery       130
Conclusions       131
4. Falaise 138
“Probably the most costly, controversial order given in the European theatre during World War Two”       138
“A solid shoulder” or “a broken neck”: The Decision of Bradley on August 13, 1944       140
Throw Them Back “into the sea”: The Counterattack through Mortain       144
Bradley as ­Second-Mover: Reacting to the Attack of Hitler at Mortain       145
“A kick up the fork”: Decisions and ­Non-Decisions of Montgomery       148
Force Destruction versus River Crossing: The Decision of Bradley of August 14       150
The Outcome: “August 15 was the worst day of my [Hitler’s] life”       151
The Long and the Short of the Hooks       154
A Clear Allied Triumph, If Not “the greatest achievement in military history,” Yet One More Incomplete Cop: Rating the Outcome       157
“Still comparatively virgin”: Explaining the Outcome       158
“Something altogether uprooted that wanders around”: Rating the Decisions on the Counterattack       60
“An arrogant slap in the face”: Reasons for Bradley’s Decision of August 13       161
“Patton had to be saved from himself”: Assessing a Major Reason for Bradley’s Decision       163
“Monty happily forgave us our trespasses”: Assessing Other Justifications of Bradley’s Decision       164
“A great mistake”: Rating Bradley’s Decision of August 13       166
“Squeezing the toothpaste”: Rating the Decisions on the Northern Jaw       167
“I still don’t understand why the Allies did not crush us”: Rating the Later Decisions       168
“Who was responsible to whom”: ­Meta-Decisional Muddling of Responsibility       170
“Pay no attention to Monty’s Goddamn boundaries”: Coordinational Confusion       172
“Egregiously wrong”: Inconstant Information       174
When Were the Allied Commanders Wrong?       176
What Would Napoleon Have Done?       177
Conclusions       178
­Decision-Scientific Addendum to Chapter 4       182
5. Arnhem 188
We “simply stared, stunned, like fools”       188
“Militarily the war is won”: The Decision on Arnhem       191
The First Week: The Planning Fallacy Again       197
“I shall probably give it up”: The Decision to Retreat       199
“Few episodes more glorious” or Jumping Off a Cliff: Ratings of the Outcome       201
Force Strengths       202
“Unquestionably would have been successful”: Luck       203
“Steady, Monty…. I’m your boss”: ­Meta-Decisions and Situational Factors       205
“Fantastic” Thoughts of Berlin, “lust for glory,” and Interpersonal Tension       207
“Winc[ing]” in Recognition of Stiffened Enemy Resistance       208
Those Photographed Tanks Must Need Servicing: Informational Interpretations       210
The Underappreciated Alternative: Taking the Scheldt       212
“Napoleon would no doubt have realized … but Horrocks didn’t”: Informational Processes       214
“Had the pious teetotaling Montgomery wobbled into [Allied headquarters] with a hangover, I could not have been more astonished”: The Value of Surprise       216
Choosing Among Alternatives: Was Arnhem, Indeed, a Bridge Too Far?       218
Risk Aversion        218
At a Crest at Brest: The ­Sunk-Cost Fallacy       219
Concentration into “one really powerful and ­full-blooded thrust”: Military Precepts Invoked       223
Conclusions       224
­Game-Theoretic Addendum to Chapter 5       227
Actual Strategic Choices       231
Chapter Notes       233
Bibliography       253
Index       259